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I. INTRODUCTION
The production of electrical power is a requirement of
most societies.1 From the discovery of fire to the splitting of an
atom, societies have built grand empires, cities, and nations
around the benefits of power. Today, power production
continues to play an integral role in the development and
security of most nations. Modern America is no exception.
Both the United States military and general society rely
heavily upon a stable supply of electricity to operate safely
and effectively. Without the power people fundamentally rely
on, modern society has the potential to slip into utter chaos.
When New York, the city that never sleeps, ground to a
powerless halt in 1977, the potential chaos became a
temporary reality. The 1977 New York Blackout provides a
stark example of America's reliance on domestic power
production. During the New York power outage, it took
officials twenty-five hours, a little more than one day, to

For purposes of clarity, the term power and electricity will be used
interchangeably to refer to electrical power.
1
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restore power to the city.2 Within that time, “arsonists had set
more than 1,000 fires and looters had ransacked 1,600 stores . .
. .”3 Regardless of the reasons behind the 1977 New York arson
and looting, one fact remains, the protection of power
production capabilities is critical to prevent societal
breakdown and ensure strong national security.
Imagine for a moment that instead of an accidental
outage, the 1977 New York blackout was the product of an
intentional act of terrorism. The control, damage, and
disruption caused by such a hypothetical event, correlated
with the real effects of the actual blackout, highlights why
both the United States government and military are constantly
concerned with the protection of domestic power production
facilities. Additionally, with the United States military’s heavy
dependence upon civilian power production, the issue of
power stability and security is critical. 4 Without a secure
source of power, especially in times of emergency, the United
States could find itself in a weak and compromised position.
Because the production of electricity is crucial to American
prosperity, there is an ever-present concern regarding the
physical security and cybersecurity of critical power

Jennifer Latson, Why the 1977 Blackout Was One of New York’s Darkest Hours, TIME (July 13, 2015), https://time.com/3949986/1977blackout-new-york-history/.
2

3

Id.

Loren Thompson, Critical U.S. Sites Can’t Cope With a Prolonged
Power Outage, FORBES (May 18, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2018/05/18/critica
l-u-s-military-sites-cant-cope-with-a-prolonged-poweroutage/#6b328e34436e; see also Dept. of Defense, Defense Science
Board, Resilient Military Systems and the Advance Cyber Threat, DSB
REPORTS (Nov. 1, 2019, 2:05 PM),
4

https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/2010s/ResilientMilitarySystemsC
yberThreat.pdf; Installation Energy, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SUSTAINMENT, (Nov.

1, 2019, 2:08 PM),
https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/IE/FEP_index.html; Lisa A. Jung,
DEPT. OF DEFENSE, FY 2019/ FY 2020 ENERGY RESILIENCE AND CONSERVATION INVESTMENT PROGRAM GUIDANCE (Sept. 15, 2017); John
Conger, DEPT. OF DEFENSE, ELECTRIC POWER RESILIENCE MEMORANDUM (DEC. 16, 2013).
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production facilities. 5 For example, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) has specific guidelines dedicated to the
protection of nuclear power and waste storage facilities. 6
These protocols exist specifically to protect nuclear power
facilities from the threat of physical terrorism, sabotage, or
organized assault.7 However, in recent years, important nonnuclear sectors of the domestic power production industry
have been all but forgotten. New threats, mostly in the realm
of state gun laws, have created seemingly insurmountable
hurdles for those power facilities that seek adequate levels of
physical security.
Gun laws are a unique and often inflammatory
political issue. From strict gun bans to open carry statutes, gun
laws represent a divisive and controversial issue in American
politics. Due to the political division regarding gun
regulations and the fact that the United States is a
conglomerate of semi-autonomous states, gun laws in one
state often look very different from those in neighboring

Supra note 4; see also United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism et
al., The Protection of Critical Infrastructures Against Terrorist Attacks:
Compendium of Good Practices, UN (Nov. 1, 2019 2:45 PM),
https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/Compendium_of_Good_Practices_Compres
sed.pdf; Critical Infrastructure Security, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY (last visited Nov. 1, 2019 2:49 PM),
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/critical-infrastructure-security; Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (NIPP) 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,
5

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Nati
onal-Infrastructure-Protection-Plan-2013-508.pdf (last visited

July 14, 2020); 6 U.S.C. § 652 (2019); Department of Homeland Security et al., Energy Sector-Specific Plan, Energy Section-Specific Plan
(2015).
Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security
Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,800
(Sep. 11, 2009); see also 42 U.S.C. 2201a (2019).
6

Id.; see also Revision of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security
Personnel, 84 Fed. Reg. 8,546 (Mar. 8, 2019).
7
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states.8 State-level gun laws, particularly the more restrictive
ones, inadvertently pose a distinct threat to the physical
security capabilities of myriad American power facilities.
Some restrictions are so severe that even nuclear facilities have
been unable to obtain handguns for their security forces. 9
These state-level restrictions are one reason why federal
firearms preemption was proposed and applied to the nuclear
power industry. 10 Regardless, privately-operated power
Guide to the Interstate Transportation of Firearms, NRA-ILA (Nov. 2,
2019, 2:57 PM), https://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/; see also Nicholas Duva, Gun Laws Vary State by State: CNBC Explains, CNBC (Nov
2, 2019, 2:59 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/11/20/gun-lawsvary-state-by-state-cnbc-explains.html; Traveling This Autumn? Know
The Laws Before You Go, NRA CARRY GUARD (Nov 2, 2019, 2:03 PM),
https://www.nracarryguard.com/resources/gun-laws-by-state/
(Because gun laws are so complex, as evidenced by the NRA gun
law map and the CNBC report, the NRA even provides a source that
gun owners can use to determine the legality of their permits and
firearms when traveling across state lines.).
8

Issuance of Orders Designating an Interim Class of NRC Licenses
Facilities that are Eligible to Apply to the Commission for Authorization to use the Authority Granted Under the Provision of Section
161a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended and Associated
Federal Register Notice, dated June 5, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML 13038A114); San Onofre Nuclear, Unit 2 and 3 and Independent
Spent Fuel Storage Installation – Safety Evaluation Re: Issuance of
Order and Conforming Amendments Concerning Preemption Authority, dated January 8, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML
15027A239); Indian Point Nuclear Generating, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3 –
Issuance of Order and Conforming Amendments Concerning Stand
Alone Weapons Preemption Authority, dated January 7, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 14259A218); FRN, Issuance of Confirmatory
Orders, Authorize Use of Preemption Authority Granted Under Provisions of Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended, dated Jan. 19, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16004A118).
9

Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security
Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,800
(Sep. 11, 2009); see also Revision of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by
Security Personnel, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,100 (Jun. 25, 2014); Energy, 10
C.F.R. § 73 (2019); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2201a (2019); Karen D. Cyr et al.,
Firearms Guidelines Implementing Section 161A. of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 and Associated Policy Issues - Supplemental Information
SECY-08-0050, Commission papers (SECY) for 2008 (Nov 2, 2019,
10
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facilities are still forgotten when states propose and apply
sweeping gun bans and restrictions. These laws have left
many facilities, even nuclear facilities, utterly defenseless
against organized kinetic attacks. If America wants to ensure
strong national security and resilience, the government must
take action to address the security problems posed by statelevel gun laws.
In consideration of the foregoing, to ensure continued
success and prosperity, specifically in reference to America's
reliance on domestic power production, the government must
take action to ensure the adequate security of domestic
production facilities. Whether the government chooses to
modify existing NRC preemption guidelines or establish a
critical infrastructure security force controlled by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), one of the two
solutions must be selected to ensure continued American
success and security.
This note will address the dangers of firearm
regulations to power facility security, the history behind
industry-specific solutions, the current concern over power
facility physical security, and applicable resolutions to the
issue at hand. Additionally, this article will not only present a
comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of the issues but also
provide a source by which others can easily understand and
locate current NRC firearm preemption authority. The article
will cover four sections specific to the current national security
issues posed by state gun laws. Section one will address the
national security implications of critical infrastructure
security, section two will explain the ongoing impact of state
gun laws on power facility security, section three will explore
the history and application of NRC firearms preemption, and

8:56 PM), https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/commission/secys/2008/secy2008-0050/20080050scy.pdf; Stephen G. Burns et al., Firearms Guidelines Implementing
Section 161A. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Associated Policy Issues - Supplemental Information SECY-08-0050, Commission papers
(SECY) for 2008 (Nov 2, 2019, 8:59 PM),
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/commission/secys/2008/secy2008-0050a/20080050ascy.pdf.

A Hidden Threat to National Security

121

lastly, section four will layout the proposed solutions and their
effective implementation.

II. THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
Multiple national and international agencies have
discussed the issue of national security as it relates to power
production facilities, also known generally as critical
infrastructure (CI).11 These papers, reports, and memorandum
address both the physical- and cyber-security aspects of
relevant CI.12 For the purposes of the United Nations (UN) and
DHS documents mentioned in this article, the term CI
encompasses “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual,
so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction
of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact
on security, national economic security, national public health
or safety, or any combination of those matters.”13 For example,
the UN report discusses both the importance of physical- and
cyber-security at assets crucial to societal functionality and
safety like train stations, airports, and power production
facilities. 14 Though the focus of this article is the physical

42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2019); see also United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism et al., The Protection of Critical Infrastructures Against
Terrorist Attacks: Compendium of Good Practices, UN (Nov. 1, 2019 2:45
PM), https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/Compendium_of_Good_Practices_Compres
sed.pdf; Critical Infrastructure Sectors, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/critical-infrastructuresectors (last visited Nov. 5, 2019, 9:24 AM); Critical Infrastructure Security, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
11

https://www.dhs.gov/topic/critical-infrastructure-security
(last visited Nov. 1, 2019 2:49 PM).
12

Supra note 4, 5.

13

Supra note 11.

United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism et al., The Protection of
Critical Infrastructures Against Terrorist Attacks: Compendium of Good
Practices, UN, https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp14

con-
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protection of power production facilities, or critical
infrastructure utilities (CIU), the UN and the DHS apply
similar analyses of threat and societal disruption to all facets
of CI. 15 Governments from across the globe, including the
United States, acknowledge and attempt to address the most
pressing security concerns as they relate to the protection of
CI. Though cybersecurity is currently considered the
prominent threat to CI, physical security is still pertinent,
especially when simple and effective measures can aid in
overall CI security.16
President Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience, provides a unique and
candid look at the importance of CI to the United States, its
government, military, and citizens. 17 Not only does PPD-21
explain the impact of America's many interdependent societal
and CI systems, but also expresses security concerns about its
multiple CI assets.18 PPD-21 is one of the primary documents
which guides the implementation of modern CI security
analyses’ and guidelines.19 Though focusing heavily on cybersecurity and its relation to physical-security, PPD-21 and the
DHS PPD-21 Implementation White Paper express the general

tent/uploads/2019/01/Compendium_of_Good_Practices_Co
mpressed.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2019, 2:45 PM).
15

Supra note 4, 5.

Supra note 4, 5 (As seen in many of the new documents, especially
those after the fear of 9/11 have subsided, the new concern in regards to infrastructure security is cyber terrorism. Most of the article’s titles and concerns revolve not around a large scale physical
attack but a large scale cyber-attack or cyber and physical attack
combined.).
16

Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, The White House President Barack Obama (Feb. 12, 2013),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-criticalinfrastructure-security-and-resil.
17

18

Id.

19

Id.
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concern of CI security. 20 According to the DHS and former
President Barack Obama, CI security is important because:
The Nation’s critical infrastructure provides the
essential services that underpin the American
way of life. The concept of critical infrastructure
as discrete, physical assets has become
outdated as everything becomes linked to
cyberspace. This “cyber-physical convergence”
has changed the risks to critical infrastructure
in sectors ranging from aspects energy and
transportation to agriculture and healthcare. . . .
Critical infrastructure owners and operators . . .
continue
to
experience
increasingly
sophisticated cyber intrusions, which provide
malicious actors the ability to disrupt the
delivery of essential services, cause physical
damage to critical infrastructure assets, and
potentially produce severe cascading effects.21
As such, the continual protection of America's CI assets, both
physical and cyber, remains vital due to the potential damage
and cascading effects that result from CI, particularly CIU,
disruption. Though the concerns expressed in PPD-21 and the
DHS PPD-21 White Paper represent a single piece of the
puzzle when it comes to understanding CI importance, they
provide an insightful brief of the issues facing CI assets and
their relation to national security. Likewise, because CIUs are
part of overall CI, CIUs should receive the same security
treatments as other CI systems and assets.

Id.; see also Interagency Security Committee, Presidential Policy Directive 21 Implementation: An Interagency Security Committee White Paper, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
20

https://www.cisa.gov/publication/isc-ppd-21implementation-white-paper (last visited Nov 27, 2019).

Interagency Security Committee, Presidential Policy Directive 21 Implementation: An Interagency Security Committee White Paper, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
21

https://www.cisa.gov/publication/isc-ppd-21implementation-white-paper (last visited Nov 27, 2019).
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Mirroring PPD-21 and the DHS PPD-21 White Paper is
the domestic and international acknowledgment of CIUs and
their importance to societal functionality. 22 Generally, the
concern of a CIU focused attack is not the fear of potential
casualties, but the level of control and societal disruption
possible through the destruction or dominance of a state’s
CIUs. 23 In a special hydroelectric terrorism report, the DHS
specifically notes that utility disruption or utility control is
often the goal of CIU terrorism.24 As the DHS explains, CIU
terrorism, especially in places that rely heavily on small
numbers of important production facilities, benefits from the
ensuing control or disruption of desperately needed power
and not the damage or death caused by the initial attack.25
The 1977 New York riots, government studies and
memoranda, and general news discussing military power grid
reliance and insecurity provide a greater understanding of the
impact of hostile CIU control or disruption.26 The interference
of town, state, or even national power production has massive
security impacts aside from simple death or CIU destruction.
Supra note 4, 5; see also Department of Homeland Security, Worldwide Attacks Against Dams, COWARN (Nov 5, 2019, 10:42 AM),
http://www.cowarn.org/uploads/news/Worldwide%20Attacks%2
0against%20Dams%20-%202012.pdf (This product is available on the
Homeland Security Information Network – Critical Sectors (HSINCS) Dams Sector Portal. The HSIN-CS Dams Sector Portal allows for
secure information sharing between Federal, State, and local agencies and sector owners and operators. For additional distribution
information, please contact the Dams SSA at dams@hq.dhs.gov.).
22

23

Supra note 22.

Department of Homeland Security, Worldwide Attacks Against
Dams, COWARN (Nov 5, 2019, 10:42 AM),
http://www.cowarn.org/uploads/news/Worldwide%20Attacks%2
0against%20Dams%20-%202012.pdf (This product is available on the
Homeland Security Information Network – Critical Sectors (HSINCS) Dams Sector Portal. The HSIN-CS Dams Sector Portal allows for
secure information sharing between Federal, State, and local agencies and sector owners and operators. For additional distribution
information, please contact the Dams SSA at dams@hq.dhs.gov.).
24

25

Id.

26

Supra note 4, 5.
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From societal disarray to the impinging of military operations,
the crippling effect of CIU disruption reaches far beyond
initial tolls. CIU disruption can send waves of destruction
through any community, town, city, state, or nation. As such,
the security of CIUs is of the utmost importance.
Unfortunately, a hidden risk to CIU security exists within the
confines of supposedly benevolent state firearm laws.
Regardless of need or security, some state firearms law
actively prevent CIU security forces from obtaining weapons
desperately needed to ensure stable and secure energy
production. Without action on the part of the federal
government, these restrictions will continue to jeopardize
national security due to their hindrance of adequate security at
many of the country’s CIUs.

III. GUN LAWS AND THEIR IMPACT ON CIU PHYSICAL SECURITY
Before the government can draft a comprehensive
solution to firearm-related CIU security concerns, an
understanding of current federal and state firearm laws is
required. In general, firearm possession is considered a right
under the United States Constitution. 27 Regardless of
application, I am unaware of any state which has banned gun
ownership outright. However, simple ownership is not the
issue. Due to the ambiguity prevalent within legal circles
regarding the scope of the Second Amendment, especially
those in historically liberal courts and districts, many
restrictions on ownership have been proposed and applied.
These restrictions, particularly those relating to the possession
of common sporting rifles and handguns, present a unique
challenge for the security of privately owned and operated
power facilities. Some of these regulations, regardless of
benevolent motives, have actively prevented CIUs from
obtaining weapons required for basic security. 28 The stark
differences between federal and state firearm laws highlights
the security issues posed by restrictive gun laws.

U.S. CONST. AMEND. II; see also Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 635-36 (2008); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
27

28

Supra note 9.
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Currently, the federal government employs a basic set
of gun regulations that apply to all states and gun owners.
These regulations were established in 1934, 1968, and 1993 and
are enforced by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF). 29 The ATF enforces and monitors
compliance with basic federal firearm laws. 30 These laws
govern a multitude of firearm regulations, but generally, they
address the ownership and possession of standard firearms as
well as machine guns, short-barreled rifles, and short-barreled
shotguns.31 However, regardless of current political rhetoric,
federal gun laws allow any citizen, without a felony
conviction, to own and possess most firearms and
magazines.32 So long as both the weapon and the magazine
follow specific import and export regulations, size regulations,
and do not qualify as a fully automatic firearm, they will often
be considered legal.33 Under federal law, a law-abiding citizen
is allowed to possess any small arms so long as it is imported
correctly, complies with weight and size requirements, and is
not capable of fully automatic fire.34
In addition to the laws regulating standard firearms, it
is also important to note that under current federal law, the
ATF can also grant permission for law-abiding citizens or
corporations to own, transfer, and employ machine guns or
other prohibited weapons.35 The application for a machine gun
or what is commonly known as a class three weapon or

Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-931) (A revision and expansion of the National Firearms Act of 1934); see also National Firearms
Act., Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat 1236 (1934) (codified as amended at
26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872); Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 922, 925A).
29

30

28 U.S.C. § 599A (2019).

31

Supra note 29.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Id.
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firearm is long, arduous, and comprehensive.36 However, so
long as a person, or in this specific instance a CIU, follows
applicable federal law, they can possess and employ whatever
small arms, even machine guns, they desire.
As evidenced by multiple preemption requests filed by
nuclear facilities in New York and California and both state’s
restrictive gun laws, CIU’s are more concerned about
obtaining common arms than obtaining complex and
expensive prohibited weapons.37 Even in relation to security at
nuclear facilities, some of the most restrictive parts of statelevel gun laws are those which impede nuclear facilities, or
any CIUs, purchase and possession of handguns.38 Because the
ATF minimally regulates the possession of said armament,
private corporations should have the ability, at a minimum, to
obtain common small arms. The only time a private CIU
should face significant hurdles is when they attempt to obtain
machine guns; specifically, post 1986 production models. 39
However, for power facilities in California, New York, or
politically similar states, this is not the reality. Instead, state-

Supra note 29; see also Buds Gun Shop, How to Purchase NFA Title II
(“Class 3”), BUDSGUNSHOP.COM (Nov 2. 2019, 11:39 PM),
https://www.budsgunshop.com/NFAGuidelines.pdf; Gun Trust
Depot, What are NFA Firearms?, GUNTRUSTDEPOT.COM (Nov 2, 2019,
11:41 PM).
36

Supra note 9; see also N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20 (McKinney 2019);
N.Y. Penal Law § 265.10 (McKinney 2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.00
(McKinney 2019); Cal. Penal Code § 31000 (2019); Cal. Penal § 30515
(2019) (These statutes place heavy restrictions on many common
firearms. From a simple handgun to a modern sporting rifle, each
statute strictly restricts a person or corporation's right to purchase
and employ a multitude of weapons.).
37

San Onofre Nuclear, Unit 2 and 3 and Independent Spent Fuel
Storage Installation – Safety Evaluation Re: Issuance of Order and
Conforming Amendments Concerning Preemption Authority, dated
January 8, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 15027A239).
38

Supra note 29; see also Philip Wegmann, It’s Still Legal to Own a Machine Gun (It’s Also Extremely Difficult and Especially Expensive), WASHINGTON EXAMINER (Oct. 2, 2017 3:53 PM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/its-still-legal-to-own-amachine-gun-its-also-extremely-difficult-and-especially-expensive.
39
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level gun laws significantly interfere with the procurement of
even simple handguns or common sporting rifles.40
In recent years New York and California have
established themselves as politically liberal states. One
consequence of said liberalism is the substantial restriction
and regulation of gun ownership. From limiting the type of
firearms one can legally possess to requiring waiting periods
or premises licenses, both California and New York place
significant restrictions upon their citizens. 41 Said restrictions
may seem initially de minimus. However, when considering
the restrictions within the context of laws found in states like
Tennessee and Alabama, or even the federal firearm laws, the
issues of restriction and security become painfully evident.
Tennessee and Alabama, typically conservative states,
have historically employed minimal restrictions when crafting
state gun laws. Aside from a few special instances, both
Tennessee and Alabama defer to federal regulations when
structuring their gun laws. Therefore, both Tennessee and
Alabama have laws which allow civilians to possess and carry

N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20 (McKinney 2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.10
(McKinney 2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.00 (McKinney 2019); Cal.
Penal Code § 31000 (2019); Cal. Penal § 30515 (2019); see also Issuance
of Orders Designating an Interim Class of NRC Licenses Facilities
that are Eligible to Apply to the Commission for Authorization to
use the Authority Granted under the Provision of Section 161a of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended and Associated Federal
Register Notice, dated June 5, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML
13038A114); San Onofre Nuclear, Unit 2 and 3 and Independent
Spent Fuel Storage Installation – Safety Evaluation Re: Issuance of
Order and Conforming Amendments Concerning Preemption Authority, dated January 8, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML
15027A239); Indian Point Nuclear Generating, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3 –
Issuance of Order and Conforming Amendments Concerning Stand
Alone Weapons Preemption Authority, dated January 7, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 14259A218); FRN, Issuance of Confirmatory
Orders, Authorize Use of Preemption Authority Granted Under Provisions of Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended, dated Jan. 19, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16004A118).
40

N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20 (McKinney 2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.10
(McKinney 2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.00 (McKinney 2019); Cal.
Penal Code § 31000 (2019); Cal. Penal § 30515 (2019).
41
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loaded handguns as well as possess common sporting rifles
like the AR-15 and AK-47; weapons typically restricted in
states like New York and California. 42 Additionally, under
applicable ATF restrictions, both Tennessee and Alabama
permit the possession of machine guns, short-barreled rifles,
and short-barreled shotguns; weapons mentioned by
regulations such as the NRC’s 2009 firearm guidelines.43 As
such, both Tennessee and Alabama allow possession of most
weapons, including machine guns, by those who follow
applicable federal and state laws.44
Because both Tennessee and Alabama allow the
possession of commonly owned handguns, sporting rifles, and
standard capacity magazines, as well as defer to federal law in
the regulation of machine guns, short-barreled rifles, and
short-barreled shotguns, average civilians and state-based
private power companies have the freedom to possess any
small arms they desire and qualify for. 45 Tennessee and
Alabama, though not alone in the realm of permissive gun
rights, are examples of states in which CIUs can easily and
effectively address their physical security needs. CIUs based in
Tennessee, Alabama, or similarly regulated states, are merely
required to follow applicable nonrestrictive gun laws and or
ATF licensing obligations when seeking possession of legal
small arms – both semi- or fully-automatic. As a result,
facilities located in theses permissive states can easily address
their physical security needs and mitigate the risk of potential
terrorism, sabotage, or organized kinetic attack.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351 (2019); Ala. Code § 13a-11-75 (2019);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1302 (2019); Ala. Code § 13a-11-63 (2019);
Ala. Code § 13a-11-62 (2019); see also N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20
(McKinney 2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.10 (McKinney 2019); N.Y.
Penal Law § 265.00 (McKinney 2019); Cal. Penal Code § 31000 (2019);
Cal. Penal § 30515 (2019).
42

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1302; Ala. Code § 13a-11-63; Notice of
Issuance of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security Personnel;
Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,800 (Sep. 11, 2009).
43

Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security
Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,800
(Sep. 11, 2009).
44

45

Id.
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Many state firearm laws, like those found in New York,
California, and similar states, differ significantly from those
found in states like Tennessee and Alabama. As such, though
CIUs located in states like Tennessee and Alabama face few
hurdles in arming their security forces, CIUs in states like New
York or California may find it nearly impossible or downright
illegal to do the same. The primary difference between CIUs
located in Tennessee and Alabama versus CIUs situated in
places like New York and California are the restrictions placed
on the private ownership of firearms. Whereas states like
Tennessee and Alabama provide legal avenues for even a
private citizen to purchase and possess a machine gun, places
like California and New York place a blanket prohibition on
not only machine guns but also specific handguns and
common semiautomatic sporting rifles.46 Additionally, only a
few exceptions exist which would allow entities, typically state
and federal law enforcement, to easily and quickly, possess,
purchase, transfer, and carry weapons as simple as a
handgun. 47 As such, CIUs located in New York, California,
and similar states, face significant hurdles in seeking adequate
armaments to meet physical security needs.
Restrictive gun laws, like those found in New York and
California, would not be an issue if not for the fact that said
gun laws also include corporations and other business entities
in their prohibitive language. 48 However, keeping to the
namesake of so-called assault weapon bans, the goal of New
York and California gun laws is to prohibit possession of
firearms in all but the most limited of circumstances.49 Because
anyone, with a little knowledge, can incorporate or form a

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351 (2019); Ala. Code § 13a-11-75 (2019);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1302 (2019); Ala. Code § 13a-11-63 (2019);
Ala. Code § 13a-11-62 (2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20 (McKinney
2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.10 (McKinney 2019); N.Y. Penal Law §
265.00 (McKinney 2019); Cal. Penal Code § 31000 (2019); Cal. Penal §
30515 (2019).
46

Cal. Penal Code § 30625 (2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20 (McKinney 2019).
47

48

Id.

49

Supra note 41; see also Cal. Penal Code § 30625 (2019).
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business entity, the laws of New York, California, and similar
states, to achieve their restrictive goals, must include
corporations and other business entities in their list of
restricted owners. Additionally, the laws of many restrictive
states provide exceptions exclusively for law enforcement and
no one else.50 As such, private CIUs, even nuclear facilities, are
left out to dry when seeking to employ armed physical
security measures. Instead of leaving the details of security to
the corporations who operate and manage these CIU facilities,
state gun laws force CIUs to rely upon the help of local law
enforcement; the only persons capable of possessing
prohibited weapons.51 The issue of gun law impediment is so
severe that the NRC established firearm preemption
guidelines to exempt nuclear power and waste storage
facilities from potential state gun law conflicts.52
Not only do restrictive gun laws create headaches and
extra cost for privately owned CIUs, but they also promote a
lack of physical security. It is plausible that many for-profit
private facilities, instead of investing in effective armed
security, opt to employ cheaper and less restricted means of
on-sight security. From unarmed guards to an over-reliance on
surveillance and local law enforcement, restrictive gun laws
possibly incentivize the inadequate protection of CIUs due to
cost, time, and potential legal hurdles. In light of the national
security implications of CIUs, and the fact the nuclear sector
already employs methods to legally sidestep state gun laws,
preemption authority or some other means of physical
security is greatly needed to ensure the security and stability
of domestic power production.

IV. NRC FIREARMS PREEMPTION GUIDELINES
In response to state firearm restrictions, the NRC employs
what is known as preemption authorization when addressing
physical security needs in locations like New York and
California. Specifically, the NRC provides a method by which
Cal. Penal Code § 30625 (2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20 (McKinney 2019).
50

51

Supra note 40.

52

Supra note 9, 10.
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private and public nuclear power plants and waste storage
facilities can obtain an exemption from state firearm laws.53
What makes NRC preemption authority special is the fact it
specifically addresses security concerns in relation to statelevel gun laws.54 As such, the history and application of the
NRC preemption guidelines are essential to understand the
seriousness of the issues at hand.
In 2005 and later in 2009, the federal government and
the NRC implemented guidelines and laws which authorized
NRC-licensed facilities to possess and employ standard and
“enhanced weapons” in their security plans. 55 The Energy
Policy Act of 2005 and the NRC’s firearms guidelines of 2009,
which have been updated since March 2019, allow NRClicensed facilities to apply for authorization to use “enhanced
weapons” regardless of state law. 56 These guidelines,
proposed under the post 9/11 Bush administration, were
established explicitly in consideration of nuclear facility
security needs, potential terrorist threats, and the difficulty of
53

Supra note 10.

Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security
Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,800
(Sep. 11, 2009); see also Revision of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by
Security Personnel, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,100 (Jun. 25, 2014); Energy, 10
C.F.R. § 73 (2019); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2201a (2019); Karen D. Cyr et al.,
Firearms Guidelines Implementing Section 161A. of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 and Associated Policy Issues - Supplemental Information
SECY-08-0050, Commission papers (SECY) for 2008 (Nov 2, 2019,
8:56 PM), https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/commission/secys/2008/secy2008-0050/20080050scy.pdf; Stephen G. Burns et al., Firearms Guidelines Implementing
Section 161A. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Associated Policy Issues - Supplemental Information SECY-08-0050, Commission papers
(SECY) for 2008 (Nov 2, 2019, 8:59 PM),
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/commission/secys/2008/secy2008-0050a/20080050ascy.pdf; Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat.
594 (2005) (Codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15801-16524).
54

Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security
Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,800
(Sep. 11, 2009); see also 42 U.S.C.A. 2201a (2019).
55

56

Id.
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arming security personnel due to restrictive state-level gun
laws. 57 42. U.S.C §2201a, the law which authorizes NRC
preemption authority, acknowledges the security implications
of restrictive state-level firearm laws. 58 As mentioned in the
foregoing:
any law (including regulations) of a State or a political
subdivision of a State that prohibits the transfer,
receipt, possession, transportation, importation, or use
of a handgun, a rifle, a shotgun, a short-barreled
shotgun, a short-barreled rifle, a machinegun, a
semiautomatic assault weapon, ammunition for any
such gun or weapon, or a large capacity ammunition
feeding device, in carrying out the duties of the
Commission, the Commission may authorize the
security personnel of any licensee or certificate holder
of the Commission (including an employee of a
contractor of such a licensee or certificate holder) to
transfer, receive, possess, transport, import, and use 1
or more such guns, weapons, ammunition, or devices .
. . ”59
Furthermore, in support of the contention that statelevel gun laws pose a risk to the protection of CIUs and
national security, 84 Fed. Reg. 8,547 highlights that the
addition of:
42 U.S.C. 2201a. Section 161A … provide[d]
new authority to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission … to enhance security at
designated facilities of NRC licensees and
certificate holders and to enhance security with
respect to certain radioactive material or other
property owned or possessed by a NRC

57

Supra note 54.

42 U.S.C. § 2201a (2019) (Though the whole law discusses preemption and its importance, 42 U.S.C. § 2201a(b)(2) specifically discusses
the public health and safety concern surrounding the security of nuclear power and waste facilities.).
58

59

Id.
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licensee or certificate holder, or the
transportation of such material or other
property.60

Additionally, since the establishment of firearms preemption,
nuclear facilities in New York and California, states with some
of the most restrictive gun laws in the United States, have
proactively sought preemption from state firearm laws.61 In an
alarming instance from California, security forces couldn’t
obtain the handguns they desperately needed to meet basic
security goals. 62 The facility initially sought state-level
exemption from the California attorney general before turning
to the NRC. 63 Despite the magnitude and importance of
securing a nuclear power facility and waste storage site,
political forces came into play and the California attorney
general denied their request; a request that had been granted
by other California attorneys general in prior years.64
The federal government, specifically concerning the
security of radioactive material, already recognizes the risk of
some state-level gun laws. This acknowledgment, combined
with the myriad preemption applications from states like New
York and California, further solidifies that state-level gun laws
pose a significant risk to national security and CIU facilities.
It is important to note, however, that the NRC is not
advocating for what some would call the wild west of gun
deregulation. If a nuclear facility in a state like New York or
California desires to apply for preemption authority, the
facility must follow the application process laid out in the
NRC’s firearms guidelines.65 Additionally, the nuclear facility,
Revision of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security Personnel,
84 Fed. Reg. 8,546 (Mar. 8, 2019).
60

61

Supra note 9.

62

Supra note 38.

63

Id.

64

Id.

Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security
Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,800
(Sep. 11, 2009); see also Revision of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by
Security Personnel, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,100 (Jun. 25, 2014); 42 U.S.C.A. §
65
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in applying for preemption and weapons authorization, must
also comply with applicable ATF regulations relating to
standard and “enhanced weapons.” 66 The nuclear facility
applying for preemption and weapons authorization must
certify to the NRC that the use of weapons, enhanced or not, is
necessary to secure and protect:
[A] facility owned or operated by an NRC
licensee or certificate holder and designated by
the Commission, or (2) radioactive material or
other property that is owned or possessed by an
NRC licensee or certificate holder, or that is
being transported to or from a facility owned or
operated by such a licensee or certificate holder,
and which has been determined by the
commission to be of significance to the common
defense and security or public health and
safety.67
Additionally, to obtain such authorization, the NRC-licensed
facility must develop a new security plan, including a
contingency plan, to secure the facility and train the security
personnel on the proper use, storage, and maintenance of the
new weapons. 68 The NRC will only grant preemption and
weapons authorization after all relevant plans, state law
analysis, and background checks are complete, and the NRC
deems preemption and weapons authorization necessary for
the security of the facility.
Again, the NRC application requirements only apply
in those states which severely restrict the possession of
firearms to all entities, civilian and corporate. So long as state
2201a. (2019); Energy, 10 C.F.R. § 73 (2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20
(McKinney 2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.10 (McKinney 2019); N.Y.
Penal Law § 265.00 (McKinney 2019); Cal. Penal Code § 31000 (2019);
Cal. Penal § 30515 (2019).
66

Id.

Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security
Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,800
(Sep. 11, 2009); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2201a.
67

68

Id.
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law does not significantly limit an NRC-licensed facility's
ability to possess adequate firearms, and the facility, either
under state or federal law, has the authorization to possess
and employ standard or enhanced weapons, preemption
applications and modification of preexisting security plans are
not necessary.
Though restrictive firearm laws may have benevolent
intentions, the acknowledgment of state law preemption by
the federal government, combined with preemption requests
from states like New York and California, further solidifies the
national security risk gun laws pose to CIU facilities. Simply
securing nuclear facilities, facilities which only account for
10% of domestic power production, is not enough. 69
Regardless of the concern over radiation exposure and death,
concerns that are unfounded considering statistical analyses of
nuclear power incidents, national security implications of
stable power production mandate additional and
comprehensive measures to expand preemption and or
security of CIU facilities.
Despite the foregoing, it is arguable that the reason
NRC preemption exists is due to the radiological material used
in the production of nuclear energy. Such an assertion is not
incorrect. Our government must take an interest in securing
What is U.S. electricity generation by energy source?,EIA,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 (last visited
Nov. 5, 2019); see also Electricity Data Browser, EIA,
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/0?agg=2,0
,1&fuel=vtvv&geo=g&sec=g&linechart=ELEC.GEN.ALL-US99.A~ELEC.GEN.COW-US-99.A~ELEC.GEN.NG-US99.A~ELEC.GEN.NUC-US-99.A~ELEC.GEN.HYC-US99.A~ELEC.GEN.WND-US-99.A~ELEC.GEN.TSN-US99.A&columnchart=ELEC.GEN.ALL-US-99.A~ELEC.GEN.COW-US99.A~ELEC.GEN.NG-US-99.A~ELEC.GEN.NUC-US99.A~ELEC.GEN.HYC-US-99.A~ELEC.GEN.WND-US99.A&map=ELEC.GEN.ALL-US99.A&freq=A&start=2017&end=2018&ctype=linechart&ltype=pin&r
type=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0 (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (When
researching domestic energy production, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) provides useful tools and information
on their website to learn about current and past production. For
more detailed information regarding power production per energy
sector, refer to the EIA Electricity Data Browser.).
69
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nuclear material. From the creation of a dirty bomb to the
sabotage and subsequent meltdown of a nuclear facility, the
government and society as a whole, have an interest in
keeping nuclear facilities adequately armed and secured.
However, statistically speaking, nuclear facilities are far safer
than the media and the public gives them credit for. Based
upon studies of power plant meltdowns, including the
Chernobyl incident, the risk of public casualties, though
concerning, is not significant. 70 Even during the recent
Fukushima incident, according to the Japanese government,
only one casualty occurred as a direct result of radiation
exposure.71
Likewise, public concern regarding dirty bombs,
though understandable, is not well-founded. The NRC
indicates that a dirty bomb, specifically in terms of
radiological exposure, is not as alarming as the public might
believe.72 Steven Brill, an author from The Atlantic, indicated
that an incident involving a dirty bomb in the heart of
Washington D.C., aside from the casualties associated with the
Michael Shellenberger, It Sounds Crazy, But Fukushima, Chernobyl,
And Three Mile Island Show Why Nuclear Is Inherently Safe, FORBES
(Nov. 4, 2019 8:35 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2019/03/11/
it-sounds-crazy-but-fukushima-chernobyl-and-three-mile-islandshow-why-nuclear-is-inherently-safe/#45f654121688; see also Safety
of Nuclear Power Reactors, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION (Nov. 4,
2019, 8:47 PM), https://www.world-nuclear.org/informationlibrary/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/safety-of-nuclearpower-reactors.aspx; Radiation Exposure and Cancer, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (Nov. 4, 2019, 9:03 PM),
https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/radiation/health-effects/radexposure-cancer.html; Backgrounder on Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant
Accident, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (Nov. 4, 2019, 9:13 PM),
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/factsheets/chernobyl-bg.html;
70

Id.; see also Eli Meixler, Japan Acknowledges the First Radiation Linked
Death from the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, TIME (Nov. 4, 2019, 9:19
PM), https://time.com/5388178/japan-first-fukushima-radiationdeath/.
71

Backgrounder on Dirty Bombs, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
(Nov. 4, 2019, 9:31 PM),
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1814/ML18143B254.pdf.
72
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actual explosion, would result in only one radiation-related
death out of every 10,000 people exposed.73 To put that into
perspective, that would result in only 70.2 deaths out of the
estimated 702,455 people living and working within
Washington D.C.74 The NRC acknowledges this fact, claiming
that one is not likely to die from the radiological exposure of a
dirty bomb and that the purpose of a dirty bomb is to disturb
instead of destroy.75 The NRC further classifies dirty bombs as
weapons of mass disturbance instead of a weapons of mass
destruction.76
In light of the information related to nuclear facilities
and nuclear waste, issues of power stability, societal
disruption, and military power reliance become far more
concerning. Though nuclear security, especially in relation to
nuclear fuel, is important, the broader impact of power
production and potential CIU disruption merits more concern
than securing only nuclear facilities.
The federal government already understands and takes
steps to mitigate the risk of CIU disruption. Both NRC
preemption and the establishment of the Hoover Dam Police,
as well as the multiple government documents discussing CIU
security, evidence the government’s concern regarding the
physical security of CIUs.77 Unfortunately, the concentration
Steven Brill, Is America Any Safer?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 4, 2019,
9:51 PM),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-weany-safer/492761/.
73

Id.; see also QuickFacts District of Columbia, UNITED STATES CENSUS
BUREAU , https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/DC? (last visited Nov
4, 2019) (The numbers indicated above are from a 2018 population
estimate of Washington, DC).
74
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Supra note 72.
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Supra note 72.

43 U.S.C. § 373b (2019); Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of
Firearms by Security Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute,
74 Fed. Reg. 46,800 (Sep. 11, 2009); Revision of Guidelines on Use of
Firearms by Security Personnel, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,100 (Jun. 25, 2014);
Revision of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security Personnel, 84
Fed. Reg. 8,546 (Mar. 8, 2019); see also Hoover Dam Police Department Safeguarding a National Icon History and Background, BUREAU OF REC77
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of government efforts is misplaced. Ignoring for a second
regional differences and the general importance of securing
nuclear material, both hydroelectric and nuclear power
production only accounted for a measly 26.4% of national
production in 2018.78 Whereas, in the same year, fossil fuels,
such as coal, natural gas, and petroleum accounted for a
whopping 63.6% of national production.79
With power grid security and stability being a
significant concern in relation to national security, taking steps
to mitigate state gun laws within the nuclear sector is not
enough. Though NRC preemption addresses concerns over
nuclear fuel security, it does nothing to address the broader
issues of CIU stability. If the government wants to be effective
in securing its national power grid, it needs to take proactive
steps, as it did concern the NRC weapons guidelines, to
mitigate the risks of restrictive state gun laws. Without
additional security, especially for those facilities which make
up the majority of national power production, the national
power grid and its CIU producers may never meet basic levels
of physical security.

V. THE SOLUTIONS AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION
A serious gap exists between state laws and the
physical security needs of CIUs. As seen in the gun laws of
traditionally liberal states as well as the preemption requests
by nuclear facilities in New York and California, state gun
laws are actively preventing private CIUs from achieving high
levels of physical security. Though government-owned and
operated CIUs may not face similar hurdles, the fact remains,
restrictive state gun laws pose a serious threat to the security
of privately controlled CIUs. Because the American economy
is capitalistic by nature, privately owned and operated CIUs
will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. Likewise,
because power production is a lucrative business, privatelyLAMATION,

https://www.usbr.gov/lc/hooverdam/police/history.html (last
visited Nov. 5, 2019).
78

Supra note 69.
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Supra note 69.
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owned CIUs might resist excessive government encroachment
or ownership of their facilities. As such, the issue of restrictive
gun laws and CIU security is unlikely to resolve itself under
current state or federal legislation. To remedy the problem, the
federal government must take additional steps to provide
CIUs with dedicated security or exemption from state firearm
laws.
Without diving too deeply into political territory, gun
laws are a heated and controversial issue in today's politics.
Both sides of the aisle believe they have the answers and
appropriate regulations to address concerns over current
firearm issues. From sweeping controls to broad deregulation,
both parties are in a constant tug of war over the appropriate
level of gun control. However, regardless of political affiliation
or belief, something must be done to address the national
security issues related to CIUs and state-level gun laws. As
such, effective proposals must satisfy basic security standards
as well as appeal to the political leanings of the nation and its
legislators. In effect, an adoptable policy is one which solves
the issues of security, while also appealing to both
conservative and liberal notions of freedom and control.
Therefore, only two approaches avail themselves of broad and
effective adoption.
The federal government is faced with two viable
options when it comes to securing privately owned and
operated CIUs. Avoiding complex individual exemptions and
sweeping deregulation, both of which would likely fail to
garner wide support, options of preemption or dedicated law
enforcement provide the best method for resolving current
security issues. To achieve the goal of sound national security,
the government can either adopt and reform current NRC
preemption guidelines to meet CIU needs or establish a new
arm of the DHS to provide security for essential CIU facilities.
It is important to note, however, regardless of application,
both proposals must rely on metrics of importance, use, and
megawatt production to avoid unintended circumstances such
as private citizens' sidestepping state gun laws or waste
associated with excessive or unnecessary security.

A. IMPLEMENTATION
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Importance, use, and megawatt production are critical
measurements necessary for the creation of an effective
response to the issue of CIU security. Because some state-level
gun laws, like those found in New York and California, are
designed to prevent law-abiding citizens from obtaining
particular firearms, issues relating to gun laws and proposed
solutions to CIU security risks, involve distinctly political
issues. 80 Given the often juxtaposed beliefs of America's
predominant political parties, proposed solutions to CIU
security must satisfy both sides of the aisle. Metrics of
importance, use, and megawatt production are key to ensure
that both parties approve and adopt one of the proposed
solutions.
Metrics of importance, use, and megawatt production
provide a benchmark by which the government can determine
either preemption or security authorization. The ultimate goal
is to avoid creating a system in which John Doe can use
personal residential solar panels to qualify as a CIU and claim
firearms preemption or government security. Though regional
difference will undoubtedly complicate the issue, an analysis
of megawatt production combined with metrics of importance
and use provides the most effective means for authorizing
security resources or firearms preemption.
The United States generally measures CIU output in
terms of megawatts or gigawatts. 81 To avoid confusion, in
terms of power production, one megawatt is equivalent to one
thousand kilowatts; kilowatt being the base metric for power
output measurement.82 Likewise, one gigawatt is equivalent to
one thousand megawatts.83 To put this in perspective, seeing
as one thousand kilowatts is the equivalent of one million
watts, a standard forty watt light bulb is equivalent to 0.04
kilowatts. 84 If a power facility produced one megawatt of

80

Supra note 41.

Electricity Explained Measuring Electricity, EIA,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/measuringelectricity.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2019).
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power, that facility would generate enough energy to power a
total of twenty-five thousand forty watt light bulbs. This
distinction is important because, depending on the capabilities
if a private citizen versus the standard capabilities of an
operational CIU, it provides a generally clear delineation
between personal and public power production. The goal of
new preemption laws or security authorization is to protect
CIUs while also preventing government waste or subversion
of state law.
In 2018, the United States produced a total of 4,273.96
gigawatts of energy. 85 This measurement of power is a
combination of measurable personal, on-site, and public
power production.86 To avoid issues of inappropriate access to
firearms preemption or government security, an assessment of
the data and the creation of megawatt cutoff limits must occur.
Though the statistics are available, an accurate analysis of the
data, with considerations for regional needs, is outside the
scope of this paper. However, agencies like the Department of
Energy (DOE), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), or the NRC have the abilities and knowledge to
determine correct megawatt cutoff metrics. As such, the
government should employ the agencies and knowledge
available to it to establish accurate and practical cutoff limits.
Because cutoff limits are an effective and necessary tool to
ensure program efficiency and success, the government
should also place control of the implementation and
modification of said limits with the most capable and
knowledgeable agency available.
In addition to the implementation of megawatt cutoff
limits, the government must employ additional metrics of use
and importance to determine which facilities should receive
preemption or security authorization. Though megawatt

Supra note 69; see also In 2018, the United States consumed more energy than ever before, EIA,
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=39092 (last visited Nov. 6, 2019).
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Form EIA-860 detailed data with previous form data (EIA-860A/860B),
EIA (Sep. 3, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/
(For information relating to 2018 statistics, open the 2018 ZIP file
available on the linked page.).
86
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production is generally an important metric, some facilities,
especially those closer to the megawatt cutoff limit, should be
analyzed to determine the importance of their security. These
analyses of cost-saving and safety are to ensure statutory or
program success.
In general, most utilities operate through the use of
multiple power production facilities. 87 Additionally, those
facilities, when combined, often can produce more power than
is typically used.88 Due to the multitude of facilities available
to most utility corporations, an inherent amount of backup is
built into the system. 89 In Tennessee, for example, the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is in the process of
decommissioning some of its old coal plants. 90 TVA can
Id.; see also Potential Paradise Fossil Plant Retirement Final Environmental Assessment, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (Feb. 2019),
https://www.tva.gov/file_source/TVA/Site%20Content/Environm
ent/Environmental%20Stewardship/Environmental%20Reviews/P
otetial%20Retirement%20of%20Paradise%20Fossil%20Plant/TVA%20P
aradise%20Final%20EA_Web.pdf; Approaches to Resiliency at TVA,
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (last visited Nov. 27, 2019, 3:41 PM),
https://www.tva.gov/file_source/TVA/Site%20Content/Energy/T
ransmission/TVA%20Grid%20Resiliency.pdf; How the Electricity
Grid Works, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Feb. 17, 2015),
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/how-electricity-grid-works;
James Bruggers, TVA Votes to Close 2 Coal Plants, Despite Political
Pressure from Trump and Kentucky GOP, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Feb.
14, 2019), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/14022019/tva-coalpower-plants-shut-down-vote-trump-mcconnell-pressure-paradisekentucky-bull-run-tennessee.
87
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Id.
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Id.

Potential Paradise Fossil Plant Retirement Final Environmental Assessment, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (Feb. 2019),
https://www.tva.gov/file_source/TVA/Site%20Content/Environm
ent/Environmental%20Stewardship/Environmental%20Reviews/P
otential%20Retirement%20of%20Paradise%20Fossil%20Plant/TVA%20P
aradise%20Final%20EA_Web.pdf; see also James Bruggers, TVA Votes
to Close 2 Coal Plants, Despite Political Pressure from Trump and Kentucky GOP, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/14022019/tva-coal-power90
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achieve said decommissioning due to the fact they have
additional facilities capable of meeting and exceeding the
power needs of their service area.91 In a worst-case scenario, at
least in TVA’s instance, they have facilities that can backup or
fill a gap caused by the disabling of one or two of their CIUs.92
For a proposed solution to work, in addition to
implementing a megawatt cut off limit, the government needs
to determine the use of power produced and the importance
of the facilities requesting preemption or security. The goal of
proposed solutions is to retain state gun laws while also
providing an exemption or security process for facilities
critical to national security. A simple way to achieve solution
success is to mandate that only those CIUs which provide
power to the public or government, not those which are
dedicated to personal use or sight-based power production,
qualify for preemption or security authorization.
Additionally, once determining that each facility
satisfies the megawatt and use requirements, the government
must analyze the importance of said facility in relation to the
overall needs of the local power grid or service area. The goal,
specifically when employing government-provided security, is
to minimize the overall expense and force required to
maintain a basic level of security. It is not worth the
government's time to provide preemption or security
personnel to a production facility whose sole purpose is to
power a job site, create personal residential power, or provide
backup in the event of a noncritical facility failure. Though the
government should take steps to ensure adequate security of
grid-wide power production, including backup capacity, the
government should be mindful to avoid overextension of
preemption, funds, and security forces.
Concerning determinations of importance and use, the
government should employ the knowledge and expertise of
plants-shut-down-vote-trump-mcconnell-pressure-paradisekentucky-bull-run-tennessee.
Id.; see also Approaches to Resiliency at TVA, TENNESSEE VALLEY AU(last visited Nov. 27, 2019, 3:41 PM),
https://www.tva.gov/file_source/TVA/Site%20Content/Energy/T
ransmission/TVA%20Grid%20Resiliency.pdf.
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the DHS, the DOE, the FERC, and the NRC. Each agency,
especially the NRC, has experience in all or part of the fields of
energy production, CIU operation, power grid stability, CI
security, and to some extent, firearms preemption. By
involving the appropriate agencies in the determination of
preemption or security authorization, the government can
more effectively allocate resources and apply the law.
In addition to experience and knowledge, agency
involvement also removes some of the complications
associated with drafting a law to meet the needs of nationwide
CIUs. Instead of focusing on an elaborate list of specifics, the
government can propose general guidelines that its agencies
can follow and implement in the most effective and efficient
manner possible.
Regardless of the solution, the proposed applications
of megawatt cut off limits, importance, and use are necessary
for the implementation of either firearm preemption or
government-provided security. Without the analysis of
production, use, and importance, the guarantee of fiscal and
operational success is uncertain. However, once those policies
and guidelines are adopted, the implementation of a
successful solution, either preemption or government security,
is rather straight forward.

B. FIREARMS PREEMPTION
Preemption, as applied by the NRC, is the first and most
obvious solution to the issue of CIU physical security. Like it is
applied to nuclear facilities, preemption for qualifying CIUs
would allow said facilities to ignore state law and begin
arming their security forces with previously prohibited
firearms. 93 The major benefits associated with adopting a
preemption approach are ease of implementation, the
efficiency of achievable security, and the lack of overall cost
associated with the administration of a preemption program.
43 U.S.C. § 373b (2019); Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of
Firearms by Security Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute,
74 Fed. Reg. 46,800 (Sep. 11, 2009); Revision of Guidelines on Use of
Firearms by Security Personnel, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,100 (Jun. 25, 2014);
Revision of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security Personnel, 84
Fed. Reg. 8,546 (Mar. 8, 2019).
93
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First, because the NRC is already engaged in granting
firearms preemption in states with restrictive gun laws, the
framework and application of a general CIU preemption law
is already established. The NRC, since 2009, has been
amending and shaping its preemption policies to meet the
requirements of modern-day America.94 The NRC has created
an effective and functional preemption program for nuclear
power and waste storage facilities. Aside from the addition of
the megawatt, use, and importance guidelines, and the
addition of other agencies, the basic and effective framework
for a new preemption law already exists. Congress would
simply have to copy the NRC preemption guidelines and
lightly modify them to include the new agencies and
additional requirements. Once modifications have taken place,
the entire bill can go before its respective bodies, be amended,
and voted on as necessary. In short, the solution of preemption
is initially beneficial because it requires minimal drafting or
debate to modify and broaden an already effective program.
Second, efficiency, which also relates to cost, is an
undeniable benefit of a federal CIU preemption law. Because
the NRC preemption guidelines, which the government
should broaden to apply to all CIUs, rely on the owner of the
nuclear facility to apply for and employ small arms, both
semi- and fully-automatic, the application of said law is
inherently efficient. Instead of micromanaging the security of
nuclear facilities across the nation, the federal government is
merely acting as an oversight board. The purpose of the
government in this instance is not to provide security, but to
provide guidelines by which each nuclear facility can develop
and obtain the means for their own security.95 Under current
NRC guidelines the government will only grant preemption
when nuclear facilities have met certain government-defined
security and operational goals.96 Once those goals have been
achieved, depending on the state in which the nuclear facility
operates, the facility owners can quickly seek possession of
small arms for their security forces. Aside from oversight and
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management of the application process, a preemption
approach similar to current NRC guidelines would cost the
government very little.
Preemption would also be more efficient and costeffective due to the complexities surrounding the employment
of government forces at private facilities. Firearms
preemption, which leaves security in the hands of the facility
itself, avoids many of the headaches associated with the use of
government forces on private land. Instead of dealing with
applicable regulations, budgeting concerns, access, and
company security, as well as conflicts regarding the control of
security forces, preemption provides almost complete control
to the private corporation. Rather than creating a complex,
healthy, and viable private-public relationship for security
forces, preemption leaves everything, but regulatory aspects,
in the hands of the private corporation. Further, the
application of preemption is also cost-effective. Instead of
burdening taxpayers with the cost of creating a new security
force, the government leaves the development and
implementation costs to the corporation.
In addition to cost and efficiency, a preemption plan is
also more secure. Unlike efficiency and cost, security relates
less to government options and more to the benefits of any
solution other than the current status quo. One of the main
points elaborated upon in DHS and UN reports is one of
intelligence sharing and cross-communication.97 Elaborated in
those reports is the importance of intelligence communication
protocols.98 One of the best deterrents to attack is intelligence.
Intelligence allows anyone to prevent an attack or, when
prevention is not possible, mount an adequate defense.
Unfortunately, as with all things government-related, some of
the available intelligence may be classified or restricted. 99
Intelligence restrictions are why both the DHS and UN
recommend the implementation of systems that allow for the
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transmission of intelligence to CIU operators and security
personnel.100
On its face, intelligence sharing seems simple in
implementation. However, when a company, due to state law,
must involve outside security forces, intelligence sharing
becomes significantly more complex. Instead of dealing
strictly with the corporations and their authorized personnel,
an additional step of 3rd party authorization comes into play.
3rd party authorizations add time and complexity to a process
that, arguably, should be as simple and secure as possible. By
allowing firearms preemption in restrictive states, the
government eliminates an unnecessary level of complexity. In
allowing the power companies to maintain private security
forces, the streamlining of authorization and information
security can occur. Instead of creating long chains of
authorized personal and secret intelligence communications,
which could increase the risk of a security breach, the
government can deal with the corporations themselves. In the
end, the implementation of firearms preemption provides an
opportunity for intelligence sharing protocols to be
established, streamlined, and combined with preemption
security plan requirements.
Despite the benefits, preemption does have one
significant drawback; it lacks organization and uniformity.
Organization and uniformity are keys to the success of any
operation. For example, in a game of chess, if one fails to use
their pieces to their full potential and does not maintain
organization, the enemy has a greater chance of exploiting
their adversary's weaknesses. The same sentiment applies to
the United States military. From the largest of fleet movements
to basic logistics, uniformity and organization are crucial to
the understanding of the battlefield and our military's
operational success. The same notion applies to the protection
of CIUs.
Preemption or government security is useless if it
cannot ensure uniform application. If there are disparities in
the security levels of CIUs, especially disparities within the
same region, preemption will be effectively useless. Though
some facilities may have and employ adequate security, those
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who do not could be a weak link within the CIU chain. If
uniform guidelines of security are not followed or enforced by
the federal government, threats my still arise and succeed in
the disruption of stable power production. Though no security
plan is foolproof, uniformity is key to avoid giving the enemy
an objectively easy and obvious target.
Though preemption is viable in avoiding the
restrictions associated with state firearm laws, it may prove
difficult to ensure any level of security uniformity. Even when
looking at NRC preemption authorization, the government
merely employs a basic level of security requirements.101 Aside
from the minimal security requirements needed to obtain
firearms preemption, the government has little if any control
over the use of said security forces and weapons. To ensure
any level of uniformity under a preemption program, the
government would have to engage in costly and frequent
monitoring. Though said monitoring may not be unfeasible or
even as costly as employing government-controlled security, it
may prove difficult to ensure CIUs are maintaining security
standards.
Like many people witness in their private lives,
standard operations and daily inspections differ depending on
what society considers best practices. Societal best practices
may not always align with the instruction of governing bodies.
Regardless of origin, the implementation of federal or
corporate mandates can differ significantly. As such, though
the government can mandate minimal security requirements
and monitor them appropriately, the inherent autonomy
associated with preemption allows for some level of
operational deviance. Therefore, though preemption is a
viable option, it lacks, to some extent, strict government
uniformity.
C. GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES
Though preemption appears to be a strong and viable
option for addressing the issues of restrictive state firearm
laws, government-provided security is also another equally
viable option. Like preemption, there are many benefits
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associated with government-provided security. Additionally,
preemption and government security share the overwhelming
benefit of secure access to government acquired intelligence.
However, aside from easy access to the intelligence
community, the benefits of government security differ sharply
from those associated with preemption.
Being almost the natural opposite to a preemption
approach, the pros and cons of government security are
closely juxtaposed to those associated with preemption.
Whereas preemption faces uniformity issues, government
security does not. Likewise, though preemption favors fiscal
conservatism, government security favors big government and
spending. Regardless, government security is still a viable
approach to the issue of securing vital CIUs.
The overwhelming benefit of government security is
uniformity and control. Instead of leaving the implementation
of a security plan to the operators of vital CIUs, the
government takes control of all authorizations and security
planning. Because the government is the primary controller of
all CIU security forces, uniform application of procedure,
armaments, supplies, and training is possible. Instead of
relying on each power producer to employ, train, and arm
required security forces; the government can take direct action
to ensure security across the board.
In many ways, government security is more preferable
to the approach taken by preemption. Instead of relying on
oversight boards, fines, and inspectors to ensure uniformity of
security, the government, mainly the DHS, has complete and
unilateral control over its application of force. By controlling
the providers of security, the government bypasses issues
associated with private security and ensures complete
uniformity through security force regulation and control. As
such, though preemption can achieve general uniformity,
government-controlled security is perhaps the most efficient
and ideal solution when uniformity is the primary goal.
In addition to uniformity, government security also
offers a better application of intelligence sharing than possible
under a preemption plan. Under preemption, it is likely
nongovernmental or non-security personnel will require
access to shared governmental intelligence. The process of
setting up authorization methods, structures, and plans could
prove complex, insecure, and costly. However, in terms of

A Hidden Threat to National Security

151

government security, said problems don't exist. Because the
people securing the facility will be under the strict control of
the federal government, intelligence authorization and
employment is significantly easier. Rather than authorize
private nongovernmental persons or security forces,
government security, due to DHS security clearance
preauthorization, can distribute information directly to
relevant security forces. As such, government security is better
prepared to meet potential threats and avoid divulging
sensitive information when unnecessary. Though government
security increases implementation complexity, it reduces
intelligence inefficiencies and risks due to the authorization of
those under direct government control and maintenance; a
feat that neither preemption nor the current state of affairs can
achieve.
Lastly, government security also offers a political and
drafting benefit in the sense that modification or preemption
of state law is unnecessary. Because government security
forces, unlike private security forces, are considered an arm of
the federal government, state laws do not apply to them. As
such, government security forces can completely avoid the
restrictions and issues of state firearm laws. Not only does this
require less lawmaking, in terms of crafting an effective
preemption statute, but it is also more politically palatable.
Because firearm laws are politically divisive issues, states like
New York and California might be concerned that the federal
government is trying to create a backdoor to state gun
legislation through CIU preemption. The provision of
government security avoids said arguments.
Most states already provide an exception to the use of
firearms by federal law enforcement or the military. If
anything, the introduction of government security would
appear as a nonintrusive, non-modifying, answer to current
issues. Instead of portraying that the federal government is
trying to change state gun laws, government security provides
a solution that honors the legal autonomy and law-making
powers of state governments. Government security is in many
ways better, because it is easier to implement in the avoidance
of state gun laws as well as, in some instances, more politically
palatable. However, government security does have its
problems; both political and fiscal. Though government
security has the potential to provide astounding uniformity
and ease of state law avoidance, government security gives

152

7 LMU Law Review 2 (2020)

rise to operational costs and its own type of political
opposition.
An effective solution to the issues at hand must
appease both sides of the political aisle. While preemption
may appease the sensibilities of conservative lawmakers,
government-provided security may not. Broadly speaking,
conservatives focus on fiscal conservatism and small
government. As such, though conservatives may favor a costeffective small government preemption solution, governmentprovided security may not be as lucky. Conservatives may not
support an agency based solution because said solution would
involve significant cost to the federal government as well as
government intrusion into the private power sector. Likewise,
preemption, a solution likely favored by conservatives, might
garner liberal opposition due to the perceived usurpation of
state gun laws and a general lack of permeating government
control. Regardless, however, both solutions, though
acceptable in their own respects, have the potential to garner
political opposition from both sides of the aisle.
In addition to political opposition, the cost of
government security is another downside in terms of its
implementation. Under preemption, private businesses are
responsible for funding their security programs. However,
under government security, the federal government will be
the one responsible. The government will be responsible for
not only the creation and funding of the organization but also
the maintenance and training of all who are involved. Instead
of funding a small oversight committee or security approval
board under the DHS, the government is funding the creation
of an entirely new law enforcement branch.
Not only will the creation of a new law enforcement or
security branch be costly, but so will its maintenance. The FBI,
a federal law enforcement agency, is an excellent example of
potential security force creation and operational costs.102 Being
a national law enforcement and investigation agency, the FBI
has a substantial yearly budget. 103 It is possible that the
FBI Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2019, FBI,
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/fbi-budget-request-forfiscal-year-2019 (last visited Nov. 6, 2019).
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creation of a government CIU security force could, without
getting into the actual needs of said force, be close to the
equivalent of creating a new FBI. Though uniformity of
security and intelligence is achievable, it will likely cost an
inordinate amount to establish. With the option of preemption
available, especially a preemption proposal similar to the
NRC’s firearm guidelines, government security may be hard
for Congress, the American people, and residents of
nonrestrictive states to accept.104
Regardless of the aforementioned pros and cons, both
preemption and government security offer a viable option
when it comes to the security needs of vital CIUs. Once crucial
metrics such as megawatt production, use, and importance are
in place, either option will provide an effective avenue by
which the government can ensure the security and stability of
America's CIUs. The only step that remains is for the
government to choose and act.

VI. CONCLUSION
In consideration of the foregoing, especially the
importance of CIUs and the potential security risks posed by
state firearm laws, preemption provides the most effective and
adaptable solution available. Though government security has
the benefit of unadulterated uniformity and control, it is
inordinately complex and cost-prohibitive. Government
security would require the creation of new laws, agency
guidelines, and security protocols, as well as involve
significant costs. Preemption avoids many of these hurdles.
Though preemption is by no means a perfect solution, it is the
easiest to adopt and implement.
The legal framework for a new preemption law already
exists. The NRC firearm preemption guidelines provide
compelling evidence that a similar law would mandate and
provide for the uniform security of CIUs. With minor
modifications to current NRC guidelines, preemption can
provide an effective and rapid response to pressing security
needs. Even when considering uniformity, a downfall of the
preemption approach, said concerns are resolvable. Though
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room remains for CIU autonomy, the presence of oversight
boards and the creation of minimum mandatory CIU security
requirements ensures a basic level of security, oversight, and
implementation. If the government does discover
discrepancies, the government, like under the NRC, has the
ability and power to aid in the rectification of any security
issues.
Additionally, though firearms preemption may face
some political opposition, when considered in comparison to
available alternatives, especially those as complex and costly
as government security, preemption becomes the most
politically and legislatively viable option. Preemption is by far
the easiest to implement and best-equipped solution to rapidly
and effectively address current security discrepancies. By
using current frameworks and procedures from NRC
guidelines, Congress can rapidly and with minimal
modification, propose a comprehensive solution to the issues
at hand. The simplicity by which the government can
implement preemption is bound to garner widespread
support, potentially more support than a costly and complex
government security proposal. As such, though political
opposition is inevitable, preemption is likely the most effective
and appealing option when it comes to securing CIUs.
Therefore, preemption, despite its shortcomings, is the best
option to protect CIU facilities from the dangers and security
risks associated with restrictive state firearm laws.

